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LINGUISTIC EXPERIMENTS AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE
PHILOSOPHY
Nat Hansen and Emmanuel Chemla
Abstract
J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions
of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal
experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine dis-
tinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for
investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we
subject Austin’s methods to formal experimental investigation. His meth-
ods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction,
drawn on the basis of his ‘donkey stories’, that ‘mistake’ and ‘accident’ apply
to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the
meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as ‘intentionally’ and ‘de-
liberately’). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments
employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary phi-
losophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter
bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic
experiments.1
1 Introduction
J.L. Austin criticized traditional approaches to philosophical problems for ignoring and
distorting the ‘ordinary’ meaning of philosophically significant expressions. Austin is
still regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning over-
looked by other theorists.2 He employed an informal experimental approach to gather-
ing evidence of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a stan-
dard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics.
Austin’s method of demonstrating fine distinctions between words or phrases with
similar meanings involves constructing a type of linguistic experiment, in which we are
1Thanks to Zed Adams, Jonas A˚kerman, Emma Borg, Aidan Gray, Chauncey Maher, participants at
the conference on Empirical Data and Philosophical Theorizing at the University of Barcelona, the con-
ference on the Contemporary Significance of Ordinary Language Philosophy at A˚bo Akademi, and at the
Ratio/CCR conference on Semantics and Science at the University of Reading for comments on this paper.
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the
European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement no 229
441 - CCC.
2A recent example of this view can be found in Livingston (2012): ‘In a footnote to “A Plea for Ex-
cuses”, J. L. Austin offers one of the precisely chosen examples that illustrate the keen ear for the lan-
guage, and almost unmatched capacity for noting its fine distinctions, for which he and his method of
reflection on ordinary language were justly notorious’. See also Williams (2014, p. 44), who says ‘Austin
was fascinated by, and extraordinarily gifted in detecting, nuances of ordinary speech’, Searle (2001,
p. 226), who writes that ‘Austin did indeed have a genius for spotting linguistic differences and distinc-
tions where most people would have thought there were none’, and Cavell (1994, p. 21), where the ability
to produce examples of ordinary language use is compared to perfect pitch.
either asked to judge whether it is better to use one or the other of the words being in-
vestigated in a particular situation, or to judge whether a particular expression better
fits one or the other of a pair of situations that differ only in limited ways from one an-
other. Austin himself says that this is a method of gathering ‘experimental data’, where
the explanation of that data will be an account of the meaning of the expressions under
investigation:
First let us consider some cases. Actual cases would of course be excellent:
we might observe what words have actually been used by commentators
on real incidents, or by narrators of fictitious incidents. However, we do not
have the time or space to do that here. We must instead imagine some cases
(imagine them carefully and in detail and comprehensively) and try to reach
agreement upon what we should in fact say concerning them. If we can reach
this agreement, we shall have some data (“experimental” data, in fact) which
we can then go on to explain. Here, the explanation will be an account of the
meanings of these expressions, which we shall hope to reach by using such
methods as those of “Agreement” and “Difference”: what is in fact present in
the cases where we do use, say, “deliberately”, and what is absent when we
don’t. Of course, we shall then have arrived at nothing more than an account
of certain ordinary “concepts” employed by English speakers: but also at no
less a thing. (Austin 1966, p. 429)3
Such an investigation of the meaning of words like ‘deliberately’ is interesting in itself,
as a contribution to a descriptive theory of meaning for English (as the passage from
Austin just quoted suggests), but it is also interesting insofar as the words and concepts
being investigated figure in philosophical disputes. It is this latter project that prompts
Austin to investigate the meaning of expressions like ‘mistake’, ‘accident’, ‘deliberately’
and ‘intentionally’, specifically the role that these expressions play in discussions of re-
sponsibility, ‘what actions are good or bad, right or wrong’ (Austin 1957, p. 4), the na-
ture of action, and ‘the problem of Freedom’ (Austin 1957, p. 6).
In the middle of the 20th century there was a heated debate about whether ordinary
language philosophy involved a method of investigating meaning that was distinct
from the methods of empirical linguistics. Mates (1958) argues that ordinary language
philosophers used unreliable methods of gathering data, while Cavell (1958) defends the
distinctiveness of ordinary language philosophy, comparing claims about what ‘we’ say
to instances of ‘Transcendental Logic’, which are subject to different standards of criti-
cism and justification than ordinary claims about how people use language. Rejecting
this idea, Fodor and Katz (1963) argue that there is no defensible distinction between
3Austin was reflecting on how to gather evidence bearing on our understanding of meaning at the
dawn of the turn to using introspective, intuitive judgments (of acceptability, e.g.) as evidence for lin-
guistic theories. Though the paper from which this quote is taken, ‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink’, was first
published in 1966, after Austin’s death, the lecture on which the paper is based was delivered in 1958. See
the editor’s note in Austin (1966, p. 427).
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the kind of justification for statements about ordinary language sought by the linguist
and those sought by the ordinary language philosopher. However, there have been vari-
ous subsequent attempts (Henson 1965, Friedman 1969, Bates and Cohen 1972, Hanfling
2000, Sandis 2010, Baz 2012) to defend the distinctiveness of ordinary language philoso-
phy. In this paper, rather than entering directly into that debate, we assume that experi-
mental data is relevant to the ordinary language approach to the investigation of mean-
ing on the grounds that Austin says that it is. There may still be something else ordinary
language philosophers are doing besides collecting and explaining ‘experimental data’
(as Austin says), but that is a topic for another paper.4
Austin’s most famous experiment concerns the difference between two expressions
that, at first glance, may not seem to differ significantly in meaning: ‘mistake’ vs. ‘ac-
cident’. He says that the choice between these expressions can ‘appear indifferent. . . Yet
a story or two, and everybody will not merely agree that they are completely different,
but even discover for himself what the difference is and what each means’ (Austin 1957,
pp. 10–11). To distinguish the meaning of these expressions, Austin sets up an experi-
ment, involving his well-known ‘donkey stories’ which makes it seem clear that ‘by mis-
take’ better describes the action in one situation, and ‘by accident” better describes the
action in the other, thereby providing evidence that the meanings of the two expressions
are indeed distinct. Cavell (1965, p. 211) says that Austin ‘inspire[s] revelation’ with the
donkey stories, which go as follows:
You have a donkey, so have I, and they graze in the same field. The day comes
when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw a bead on it, fire: the
brute falls in its tracks. I inspect the victim, and find to my horror that it is
your donkey. I appear on your doorstep with the remains and say—what? ‘I
say, old sport, I’m awfully sorry, &c., I’ve shot your donkey by accident? Or
‘by mistake’? Then again, I go to shoot my donkey as before, draw a bead on
it, fire—but as I do so, the beasts move, and to my horror yours falls. Again
the scene on the doorstep—what do I say? ‘By mistake’? Or ‘by accident’?
(Austin 1957, p. 11 n. 4)
Austin’s donkey stories are so compelling, in fact, that he does not even need to say
what the most appropriate response to each situation is, and yet most of those who read
his example reach the same conclusion about which term to apply to which situation:
‘by mistake’ better suits the first story, and ‘by accident’ the second.5
In other places Austin tells similar stories with the same aim of drawing subtle dis-
tinctions between the meaning of certain phrases, but accompanies those stories with
4See Hansen (2014a) and Jackman (2001) for discussion of different conceptions of the project of ordi-
nary language philosophy.
5For explicit endorsements of the standard response to the donkey stories, see Gustafsson (2005,
p. 368), ‘We all agree that in the first scenario the donkey was shot by mistake, whereas in the second
scenario it was shot by accident’ and Hanfling (2000, p. 64), ‘The first case is “by mistake”, the second “by
accident’”.
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his own powerful glosses on ‘what we should say’. For example, the gocart story from
Austin (1966) is intended to distinguish the meaning of ‘intentionally’ and ‘deliberately’:
I am summoned to quell a riot in India. Speed is imperative. My mind runs
on the action to be taken five miles down the road at the Residency. As I set
off down the drive, my cookboy’s child’s new gocart, the apple of her eye,
is right across the road. I realize I could stop, get out, and move it, but to
hell with that: I must push on. It’s too bad, that’s all: I drive right over it
and am on my way. In this case, a snap decision is taken on what is essen-
tially an incidental matter. I did drive over the gocart deliberately, but not
intentionally—nor, of course, unintentionally either. It was never part of my
intention to drive over the gocart. At no time did I intend to drive over it. It
was incidental to anything I intended to do, which was simply to get to the
scene of the riot in order to quell it. However “odd” it may sound, I feel little
doubt that we should say here that we did run over the gocart deliberately
and that we should not care to say we ran over it intentionally. We never in-
tended to run over it. (Austin 1966, p. 432)
After reading the story and Austin’s gloss, the fact that the narrator ran over the gocart
deliberately but not intentionally seems convincing.6 But is it as obvious as it is in the
donkey story what the right thing to say about the story is? Or is Austin’s gloss signif-
icantly affecting our response? Would a different gloss have produced different judg-
ments about the story? What would happen if the gocart story were presented without
any gloss at all? Would judgments still align with Austin’s reading of the story?
The same questions about the role of Austin’s gloss apply equally to the racing-car
story from Austin (1958, p. 272):
A boy in an arm-chair is making tugging and twisting movements with his
arms, accompanied by gear-change and other raucous noises. He is ‘pretend-
ing to be driving a racing-car’, but scarcely ‘pretending to drive a racing-car’.
Why? A possible answer is this. In neither case is the behavior of the pretend-
ing party sufficiently like the genuine article. . . for it to be in point to mark
the distinction between the two. To pretend to drive a racing-car, he would
need a racing-car. . .
And once one begins to worry in general about the techniques that Austin uses to
get his readers to agree about what to say about his gocart and racing-car stories, sub-
tler worries about his methods of gathering data arise as well. Consider the donkey sto-
ries again. There is an interesting asymmetry in the way Austin presents the options ‘by
mistake’ and ‘by accident’ in the two versions of the story he tells.7 In both versions, the
6At least, it has seemed convincing to some. For examples of favorable citations of Austin’s reading of
the gocart story, see Ferguson (2003, p. 93), Searle (2001, p. 223), Williams (2009, p. 24).
7This possibility was suggested in conversation by Aidan Gray and So¨ren Ha¨ggqvist.
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response that people tend to give is presented second. One might worry that the asym-
metry in the response options is influencing judgments about the donkey stories. What
would happen if the options were reversed?
In this study, we aim to answer those questions, and in so doing we will investigate
some easily overlooked aspects of the experiments used in some paradigm cases of or-
dinary language philosophy and discuss the ways that they may corrupt the results of
otherwise legitimate experimental investigations of meaning.
2 Linguistic Experiments: Formal vs. Informal
Linguists and philosophers of language employ various methods of gathering data:
Corpus studies draw on naturally occurring uses of language and linguistic field work
aims to collect examples of language use by transcribing or recording language use ‘in
the wild’, while linguistic experiments ‘create, produce, refine and stabilize phenom-
ena’ (Hacking 1983, p. 230) in controlled circumstances. The control that experimenters
have over the data generated by experiments confers an enormous practical advantage
over straightforward observation, but it brings with it a corresponding risk that exper-
imenters are merely creating artifacts that emerge only because of the particular exper-
imental design they are employing. So it is the responsibility of experimenters to pay
close attention to the design of their experiments to ensure that they are uncovering evi-
dence of the phenomena they take themselves to be investigating.
The experiments that Austin employs, like many of the experiments employed in
contemporary investigations of meaning, are informal—they do not involve gathering
judgments from large groups of participants, running statistical tests of significance on
the data gathered, and so on. Instead, they involve the theorist reporting her own judg-
ments about situations that she herself describes, and presenting those judgments along-
side the situations in the context of an academic paper. Though there are many differ-
ences of procedure between informal and formal experiments, these informal experi-
ments are similar in an essential respect to the more formal experiments conducted by
linguists.8 Both formal and informal linguistic experiments aim to create circumstances
in which it is possible to observe the effect of an independent variable (some feature of
the context, for example) on a dependent variable (acceptability judgments or truth-
value judgments, for example).
One central difference between informal and formal experiments concerns how rig-
orously the experimenter tries to control for particular types of biasing factors, such as:
(a) the order in which conditions or response options are presented9
(b) contrast (this includes both whether participants are allowed to see contrasting
8See Sprouse et al. (2013) for an illuminating discussion of similarities and differences between formal
and informal linguistic experiments.
9See Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) for discussion of the effects of order of presentation of condi-
tions.
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experimental conditions—as in a within-subjects design—or not—as in a between-
subjects design—and whether there are contrasting response options)10
(c) experimenter bias11
(d) effects of response scales12
Controlling for those potentially biasing factors might involve systematically varying
the order in which objects of evaluation or response options are presented, employing
a between-subjects design (or a design that allows experimenters to collect responses
in both circumstances with and without potential contrast effects, as in Hansen and
Chemla 2013), removing or systematically varying the experimenter’s own preferences,
and employing different types of response options (binary t/f judgments, Likert scales,
magnitude estimation, and so on). An experimenter might refrain from going to the
trouble of employing those types of controls if she believes the phenomenon she is in-
vestigating is so pronounced that experimental biases could not obscure it. (And this
is typically what happens when informal experiments are conducted and not supple-
mented with formal experiments.)
But if a particular phenomenon is disputed, or if an effect is weak enough that small,
external fluctuations might obscure it, or if there is a specific reason to think that the
presence of some particular bias is distorting the data generated by an informal exper-
iment, then there is good reason to conduct a more formal experiment. We think there
is reason to worry about the effects of two particular types of bias in Austin’s informal
experiments—namely the role that glosses play in generating a form of experimenter
bias, and the role played by the order in which response options are presented in Austin’s
donkey stories. We conducted more formal linguistic experiments with the aim of evalu-
ating the role such biases play in Austin’s informal experiments.
3 Summary of results
In this study, we evaluated two hypotheses:
1. Glosses play an essential role in experiments a` la Austin; if the glosses are removed
or reversed, different judgments will be obtained.
2. The order in which response options are presented in experiments a` la Austin (e.g.,
with Austin’s donkey stories) may have an effect on response preferences.
In brief, we found evidence in support of hypothesis 1 but not hypothesis 2.
10For discussion of the role that contrasting experimental conditions play in recent work in experimen-
tal philosophy, see Hansen (2014b) and Phelan (2013).
11See Hansen (2013) and Strickland and Suben (2012) for recent discussions of experimenter bias.
12See Cullen (2010).
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Re 1. We found evidence that glosses have an impact on judgments. We reproduced
Austin’s claims when the gocart and racing-car stories (from Austin 1966 and 1958,
respectively—to be discussed below) were presented with Austin’s glosses. But
when the gocart and racing-car stories were presented with a gloss that suggested
the reverse of Austin’s claims about those stories, participants reversed their re-
sponses to both stories. And crucially, when presented without an accompanying
gloss, the gocart story generated no preference at all, and the racing-car story gen-
erated the opposite of Austin’ claims.
Re 2. We did not find evidence that the order of response options has any effect on judg-
ments about the donkey stories. Under experimental conditions, we reproduced
the expected difference in judgments about the two donkey stories, both when
the order of responses matched and did not match the original order proposed
by Austin. Note that we obtained these judgments from participants who could
not contemplate and compare the two stories, which shows that the judgments ob-
tained by Austin were not the result of the explicit contrast between the stories.
Our findings indicate that Austin’s methodology is a mixed bag: On one hand, he
was able to generate robust results (as with the donkey stories), on the other, some of his
results are undermined by the effects of bias.
4 Racing-Cars and Gocarts
Our interest in the gocart and racing-car stories was prompted by a worry about the role
that experimenter bias plays in influencing judgments about informally presented linguis-
tic experiments. Experimenter bias is an effect generated when experimenters disclose
(even unconsciously) their own expectations about the outcome of an experiment.13 Be-
cause the experiments employed by ordinary language philosophers are presented in-
formally, they are susceptible to certain forms of experimenter bias, the most obvious
being the fact that in some cases the theorist simply states what his preferred judgment
about the story being evaluated is. Our first experiment gathers evidence about the role
played by experimenter bias in influencing responses to two of Austin’s experiments.
To evaluate the effects of experimenter bias, we offered participants one of three ver-
sions of one or the other of the gocart and racing-car stories (the versions differed from
one another only in terms of their accompanying glosses—the details of the story, which
contain the factors that are supposed to be those influencing responses, remained ex-
actly the same):
1. Austin’s original gloss
2. Reversed gloss
3. No gloss
13See Doyen et al. (2012), Intons-Peterson (1983), and Rosenthal (1976, Ch. 8) for discussions of uncon-
scious forms of experimenter bias.
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4.1 Material for the gocart experiment
We made some minor amendments to the original version of the gocart story to make
it easier to understand (e.g., replacing ‘cookboy’ with ‘cook’, and replacing the phrase
‘right across the road’ with ‘in the middle of the road’), and, to simplify presentation, the
story was changed from a first-person narration to a third person account of ‘George’.14
It’s important to note that the changes we made to the stories were constant across con-
ditions so that any overlooked influence they may have should be the same in all condi-
tions. The story that remained constant across the three conditions read as follows:
Gocart Story
George is summoned to quell a riot in India. Speed is imperative. His mind
runs on the action to be taken five miles down the road at the Residency. As
he sets off down the drive, his cook’s child’s new gocart, the apple of her eye,
is in the middle of the road. George realizes that he could stop, get out, and
move it, but to hell with that: he must push on. It’s too bad, that’s all: He
drives right over it and is on his way.
The following is our revised version of the original gloss, which accompanied the
story in the first experimental condition:
Original Gloss: In this case, a snap decision is taken on what is essentially
an incidental matter. George did drive over the gocart deliberately, but not
intentionally. It was never part of his intention to drive over the gocart. At no
time did he intend to drive over it. It was incidental to anything he intended
to do, which was simply to get to the scene of the riot in order to quell it.
However ’odd’ it may sound, we should say here that George did run over
the gocart deliberately and that we should not say he ran over it intention-
ally. He never intended to run over it.
And the following is the reversed gloss, which accompanied the story in the second
experimental condition:
Reversed Gloss: In this case, a snap decision is taken on what is essentially
an incidental matter. George did drive over the gocart intentionally, but not
deliberately. At no time did he deliberate whether to drive over the gocart.
He simply intended to get to the scene of the riot in order to quell it. How-
ever ’odd’ it may sound, we should say here that George did run over the
gocart intentionally and that we should not say he ran over it deliberately.
He never deliberated about running over it.
14A critic might worry that by changing from the first to the third person, we are altering a significant
feature of Austin’s stories, and thereby not really experimenting with the same stories. If that’s right,
then the critic should think of the experiments we run as posing a challenge to Austin’s original stories
in virtue of the fact that they show the importance of glosses in closely related stories; the burden is then
on a defender of the original experiments to show that the glosses are not playing the same role in the
original stories.
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The third experimental condition, corresponding to the absence of a biasing gloss,
consisted solely of the revised story plus the prompt (which appeared in all three condi-
tions):
Question: Which of the following best describes what George did?
(a) George ran over the gocart intentionally.
(b) George ran over the gocart deliberately.15
4.2 Materials for the racing-car experiment
The racing-car experiment was identical in structure to the gocart experiment, giving
separate groups of participants one of three versions of the following racing-car case
(drawn from Austin 1958, p. 272):
Racing-car story
A boy in an arm-chair is making tugging and twisting movements with his
arms, accompanied by gear-change and other raucous noises.
Original Gloss: He is ’pretending to be driving a racing-car’, but not ’pre-
tending to drive a racing-car’. To pretend to drive a racing-car, he would
need a racing-car.
Reversed Gloss: He is ’pretending to drive a racing-car’, but not ’pretending
to be driving a racing-car’. To pretend to be driving a racing-car, he would
need a racing-car.
The first two conditions in the racing-car experiment featured the same prompt:
Question: Which of the following best describes what the boy is doing?
(a) The boy is pretending to be driving a racing-car.
(b) The boy is pretending to drive a racing-car.
The third condition featured a slightly different prompt to give participants relevant in-
formation that appears in both glosses:
15What if participants have no preference between the two responses? They would be forced to choose
between (a) and (b) arbitrarily, presumably leading to a 50/50 split in responses. Such a pattern could be
interpreted as an absence of preference (although one should avoid drawing strong conclusions from a
null result). One might worry that the absence of a third, no-preference option could force participants
to search for a preference even when they don’t see one immediately, and that might lead to participants
relying on irrelevant factors to make a choice between (a) and (b). But that would distort our results
only if there were a non-arbitrary factor that participants were relying on—a factor that we would have
failed to detect and which would apply consistently across our items instantiating the conditions and
across our participants. That is possible, but unlikely. And if indeed there is such a salient factor that
can help participants so robustly, it’s likely that adding a third ”no preference” option would not have
blocked participants from finding it. Thanks to Emma Borg for raising questions about the limitations of
the forced-choice response option.
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Question: Given that he is not in an actual racing-car, which of the following
best describes what the boy is doing?
(a) The boy is pretending to be driving a racing-car.
(b) The boy is pretending to drive a racing-car.
4.3 Participants
We recruited 370 participants over Mechanical Turk (see Sprouse 2011 for discussion).
Each participant was paid $0.05. Each of the participants saw only one of either the go-
cart or racing-car scenario, in only one of the glossing conditions described above (orig-
inal, reverse, neutral). Participants were also asked to answer three simple control ques-
tions to ensure they were paying attention (‘What is nine minus three?’, ‘What is three
plus three?’, ‘What is two times three?’) and to report their native language (with no
incentive in favor or against reporting English as a native language). Participants who
did not report English as their native language (10 participants) or who failed to answer
one of the three simple questions (3 more participants) were paid but excluded from the
analyses.
4.4 Results
Figure 1 shows the number of participants who opted for each option in each condi-
tion. We will describe these results from left to right. First, and unsurprisingly, with the
original gloss we obtained significantly more answers corresponding to Austin’s judg-
ments both for the racing-car scenario (χ2(1) = 16, p < .001) and for the gocart scenario
(χ2(1) = 30, p < .001).16
Number of answers of each type for the racing-car scenario:
Original gloss Reversed gloss No gloss
to be driving 46 2 9
to drive 15 61 48
Number of answers of each type for the gocart scenario:
Original gloss Reversed gloss No gloss
deliberately 50 5 27
intentionally 8 54 32
Figure 1: Number of participants who responded in accordance with the original judg-
ments about the stories are indicated by red bars, while the number who responded
contrary to the original judgments are indicated with blue bars.
Second, and importantly for our purposes, we found that this preference was re-
versed when the gloss was reversed, both for the racing-car scenario (χ2(1) = 55, p <
16We report the results of Chi-square tests with Yates’ continuity correction. We obtained similar results
with exact binomial tests for pairwise comparisons where it applies.
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.001) and the gocart scenario (χ2(1) = 41, p < .001).17 Of course, this reversal could be
the mere result of our participants trying to conform with ‘instructions’. In the context of
our experiment, participants may not read glosses as opinions from colleagues that are
open to discussion, but rather simply as instructions indicating the correct answers.
The gloss-free condition reveals that the original gloss distorts how ordinary speak-
ers respond to the story. For the racing-car scenario, participants show a clear preference
even in the absence of a biasing gloss (χ2(1) = 27, p < .001). If there was no fact of the
matter and no difference between the phrases (in this case ‘to be driving’ vs ‘to drive’)
and if the glosses were the only guide available to our participants, we would expect to
find no preference in the condition without a gloss.18 But, strikingly, the preference ob-
tained in this neutral condition is the opposite of Austin’s judgment and the one obtained
with the original gloss (χ2(1) = 27, p < .001). This is our most solid result: removing the
gloss reveals preferences that are the opposite of how they appear with the gloss.
Responses to the gocart scenario when it was not accompanied with a gloss are also
interesting. In the gloss-free condition, we found no preference between judgments that
the gocart was run over ‘intentionally’ or ‘deliberately’ (χ2(1) = .42, p = .52). The par-
allel gloss-free condition with the racing-car scenario shows that our setting is able to
reveal preferences, when they exist. Hence, the absence of preference for either response
in the gocart scenario suggests that at best the preference was over-estimated by Austin
and those who endorse his claims about the gocart story: our data does not indicate that
there is a preference beyond the effect of the gloss.19
Note as well that despite the absence of a preference for either ‘intentionally’ or ‘de-
liberately’, there is a tangible effect here: the results obtained without a gloss are statis-
tically different from those obtained with the original gloss (χ2(1) = 20, p < .001) and
the reversed gloss (χ2(1) = 19, p < .001). That confirms that the gloss may be corrupting
the data in Austin’s original gocart story. (That is, there may be no difference between
‘intentionally’ and ‘deliberately’, but the presence of the gloss makes it look as if there
is.)
17The ‘interaction’ between response and original/reversed gloss, is also found to be significant both for
the racing-car (χ2(1) = 65, p < .001) and for the gocart scenario (χ2(1) = 68, p < .001).
18This remark only applies to the gloss-free condition. It remains possible, as mentioned above, that
when there is a gloss, participants follow the gloss.
19Independent effects may artificially raise or decrease the acceptability of describing the action in the
gocart scenario as done ‘intentionally’ or ‘deliberately’. One salient candidate is the so-called ‘Knobe
effect’ (see, e.g. Knobe 2006). In a nutshell, the Knobe effect would make the use of ‘intentionally’ more ac-
ceptable in scenarios with a negative moral valence than in scenarios with a positive valence. One might
then reason that if the gocart scenario has a negative valence, preferences for describing the running over
of the gocart as done ‘intentionally’ would receive a boost, which could erase the preference there ex-
ists otherwise in favor of saying that the gocart was run over ‘deliberately’. There are two things to say
about this suggestion. First, note that Austin’s judgments should also have been affected by such an ef-
fect. So the existence of the Knobe effect would not explain a difference between Austin’s judgments and
the judgments we report. Second, for all we know, ‘deliberately’ may be subject to an equivalent Knobe-
style effect (see Pettit and Knobe 2009 and Egre´ 2014 for arguments that the effect goes beyond judgments
about the word ‘intentionally’). If that’s right, then Knobe-style effects would have parallel consequences
for both phrases, and they would not alter the preference we uncovered.
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4.5 Discussion
First, we found that responses to the neutral stories, unaccompanied by glosses, were ei-
ther the reverse of Austin’s verdict (for the racing-car story), or that, contrary to Austin’s
verdict, there was no significant difference between responses (for the gocart story). Sec-
ond, reversing the accompanying glosses reversed participants’ judgments about both
the racing-car and gocart stories. The lesson of these findings is that glosses can influ-
ence judgments about the meaning of words in two different ways: (1) The presence of
a gloss can make it look like there is a preference one way, when in fact the preference
goes the other way (as in the racing-car story); or (2) the presence of a gloss can make
it look like there is a preference one way, when in fact there is no preference (as in the
gocart story). The fact that we found positive evidence that responses to the racing-car
story are the reverse of Austin’s original judgment about that story makes it plausible
that the second error is also possible.
The role played by glosses for those participating in a formal experiment is probably
different from the role it plays for philosophers reading an academic article. The ‘work-
ers’ who are the participants in the experiment are motivated to perform correctly, and
likely understand the accompanying glosses as a kind of instruction for how to respond.
With that in mind, it’s not surprising that we found reversals of judgment about the sto-
ries when they were accompanied with reversed glosses. Philosophers might be more
resistant to the glosses than the Mechanical Turk ‘workers’ are, but there is evidence
that philosophers are no less influenced by other, extraneous features of experiments
than ordinary participants (e.g. see Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012, who show that
philosophers’s judgments about well-known moral thought experiments are affected
by order of presentation). And, for what it’s worth, we find that we can feel our own re-
sponses to the stories being swayed by the different glosses. But the key result in the go-
cart and racing-car examples is the fact that the presence of glosses can obscure, rather
than reveal, judgments about key features of the stories themselves. The key result thus
comes from the racing car scenario that is not accompanied by a gloss. In that condition,
there is no appearance of an incentive (as there may be in the cases accompanied with
glosses) for workers to prefer one answer over the other. Yet they do provide one of the
answers more robustly than the other—and their preference goes in a direction opposite
to Austin’s judgment about the story.20
20Jennifer Nagel remarked in conversation that we should leave open the possibility that our partici-
pants and Austin (and other scholars who have responded to his scenarios) speak different dialects (1950s
Oxford English in Austin’s case, and a variety of other dialects for contemporary participants). However,
our main claims are not affected by any dialectal differences. We show that a minimal change in a given
experimental situation (namely the presence or absence of a gloss) alters its outcome, and we conclude
that experimenters should beware of the possibility of experimenter biases.
We are convinced that there are indeed dialectal differences. But we do not know how to assess ac-
curately their consequences for our task. One may compare frequencies of the relevant phrases in cor-
pora from Austin’s era and from ours. But even large frequency changes would not show that semantic
changes have taken place. In fact, it is worth recalling that one important feature of language infinitude
is that phrases that appear with extremely low frequency are not beyond the reach of coherent seman-
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5 Shooting Your Neighbor’s Donkey
The second hypothesis we were interested in evaluating was that responses (to the don-
key scenario) are coerced through a subtle form of order of presentation bias, concerning
the order in which the response options (‘by mistake’, ‘by accident’) are presented in
Austin’s original stories. To test this hypothesis, we presented subjects with slightly re-
vised versions of the original donkey stories, again switching first personal elements to
third personal ones, and in which participants saw only one or the other of the two sto-
ries, thereby eliminating any contrast effects. Each story was accompanied with either a
response option featuring the original order (‘mistake. . . accident’ in the first story, and
‘accident . . . mistake’ in the second), or the reversed order. So participants saw one of
four possible combinations of story and response pairs, as follows:
1. Mistake story + original order of responses
2. Mistake story + reversed order of response
3. Accident story + original order of responses
4. Accident story + reversed order of responses
The two, lightly revised donkey stories read as follows:
Mistake
John has a donkey, so does Mary, and the donkeys graze in the same field.
The day comes when John comes to dislike his donkey. He decides to shoot
it, draws a bead on it, fires: the brute drops dead. He inspects his victim, and
finds to his horror that it is Mary’s donkey.
Accident
John has a donkey, so does Mary, and the donkeys graze in the same field.
The day comes when John comes to dislike his donkey. He decides to shoot
it, draws a bead on it, fires—but as he does so, the beasts move, and to his
horror Mary’s donkey drops dead.
Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find evidence that order made any difference
to how participants responded to the donkey stories.
tic judgments. A best case scenario for this line of inquiry would be one according to which frequency
biases affect Austin’s judgments and our participants differently (because the relative frequency of the
relevant phrases is different for Austin and for our participants). But even if that’s the case, we would still
be a long way from knowing how frequency affects judgments. Furthermore, this thesis and its putative
demonstration is less parsimonious than our own explanation of the difference in judgment in terms of
the experimenter bias we originally targeted, which we would expect to be equally active across dialects.
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5.1 Procedure and participants
We recruited 248 participants on mechanical turk, who participated for $0.05. As with
the previous study, we excluded 3 participants from the analyses because they did not
report to be native speakers of English, and 4 more because they failed to answer simple
control questions.21
5.2 Results
Figure 2 presents the number of participants in each condition who opted for each re-
sponse choice (‘by mistake’ vs. ‘by accident’).
Mistake Scenario:
Aggregated results Original order Reverse order
by accident 22 15 7
by mistake 96 43 53
Accident Scenario:
Aggregated results Original order Reverse order
by accident 58 30 28
by mistake 65 31 34
Figure 2: Number of participants who responded with ‘by mistake’ and ‘by accident’ in
different conditions.
Before we consider order effects, consider the aggregated results (the first column
of results in the tables from Figure 2). Participants’ answers reveal a preference for ‘by
mistake’ in the Mistake scenario (χ2(1) = 46, p < .001). This preference confirms the stan-
dard response to the first donkey story. In the Accident scenario, no preference emerges
(χ2(1) = .40, n.s.). Such an absence of a preference, a so-called null-result, is in general
difficult to interpret, because:
. . . there are many reasons why a study may fail to uncover a relation be-
tween variables even when the relation does in fact obtain. One may be re-
lying on instruments that do not have the necessary degree of resolution to
detect the relevant relation, for example. And every experimental result is
noisy to some degree. An absence of difference cannot establish that the dif-
ference does not exist, unless one also proves the counterfactual claim that
the experiment would have been sufficiently powerful to detect it (Hansen
and Chemla 2013, p. 7).
21We recruited one set of participants for the whole study, including gocart scenarios, racing-car scenar-
ios and the donkey scenarios. Participants were distributed randomly between the different conditions
presented in the whole study. The target was to obtain around 60 participants in each condition. Because
the assignment to conditions was random and because some participants were disqualified from the
analyses numbers are not perfectly smooth.
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Let us list three possible ways of interpreting the null result that we found in the Ac-
cident version of the donkey story. First, it may be due to the absence of an effect. Sec-
ond, an absence of result may also be obtained if the methodology we employed is not
suited or powerful enough to detect the effect. Third, and more specific to the example
under consideration, the absence of a visible preference may be the result of the combi-
nation of (i) an actual preference, say for ‘by accident’, as expected, and (ii) an indepen-
dent bias against responding ‘by accident’, e.g., because the phrase is less frequent than
‘by mistake’.22,23 In the absence of a reliable preference, it is not possible to exclude any
of these various possibilities. The upshot is that it is not possible to determine whether
or not there exists a preference between ‘by mistake’ and ‘by accident’ in the Accident
version of the donkey story.
The data we gathered do contain a tangible, second-order effect, however. Partic-
ipants reliably distinguish the two scenarios. Their preference pattern for ‘by mistake’
vs. ‘by accident’ varies from one scenario to the other: the two cells in the ‘aggregated
results’ are different, the preference changes (although it is not fully reversed) from the
Mistake scenario to the Accident scenario (χ2(1) = 21, p < .001). As a result, we can
conclude that some difference between the scenarios is affecting judgments about the
(relative) appropriateness of the two expressions. Hence, some difference in the scenario
corresponds to some difference of meaning in the two expressions. This conclusion is
possible even in the absence of a clear preference in the second scenario, because we can
make use of the powerful two-way contrasts between both phrases and scenarios em-
ployed in this experiment.
However, despite the power of such a design, for the sake of methodological rigor, it
is worth discussing two issues which remain undecidable given our data.
• First, the preference observed in the Mistake scenario does not show that partic-
ipants judged that one phrase is correct and the other is incorrect. It is possible
that participants are judging both to be correct or incorrect, and the contrast we
observed is due to there being a slight preference for one over the other. That is,
since we asked participants to judge which of the two phrases best describes the
22Google searches actually return more hits for ‘by accident’ (28M) than for ‘by mistake’ (20M). Hence,
frequencies go against (ii) in this particular case. So one may disregard this hypothesis, but the point is
more general: for all we know (and for all we tested), our setting may generate a bias against frequent
phrases.
23In principle, a visible preference could also be the result of a bias rather than a genuine preference.
Concretely, the preference observed for ‘by mistake’ in the first donkey scenario could in principle be the
result of (i) an absence of preference (or even a reversed preference) and (ii) a bias in favor of responding
‘by mistake’ or against responding ‘by accident’. The reason why such an hypothesis is not entertained
(and generally in similar situations) is that the result conforms with the expectation. Suppose a theory
T predicts the presence of an effect E and we do not find the effect or find an opposite effect E’. It is then
necessary to set up a new theory or to supplement theory T so as to explain effect E’. (At this point, sup-
plementing theory T may simply explicate the biases that may be at play to turn E into E’). If on the con-
trary we do find effect E, nothing calls for an explanation. In Bayesian terms: if an experiment is set up
with the underlying belief that some cause C would generate an effect E, then actually observing E should
reinforce our prior belief that C is the (actual) cause of E.
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situation, they may be merely recording a small difference in preference between
the two phrases. At the theoretical level, this highlights the fact that judgments of
preference are not directly linked with truth-conditional distinctions.
• Second, in the Accident scenario, in addition to not being able to conclude that par-
ticipants have a preference for one phrase or the other, our data do not indicate
whether both phrases are equally correct or equally incorrect or somewhere in be-
tween. As a result, it is not possible to use our results to argue that one phrase is
more appropriate in one scenario than in the other. We can only conclude that the
preference for one phrase disappears when we move from one scenario to the other,
but whether the felicity/appropriateness of the corresponding phrases increases or
decreases cannot be determined.
In summary, appropriateness judgments cannot be unambiguously derived from prefer-
ence judgments. Different possible situations may give rise to a preference for A over B:
(a) A is good, B is bad; (b) A is very good, B is good; (c) A is bad, B is very bad, etc. Sim-
ilarly, different situations may give rise to an absence of preference (independently of
biases hiding an underlying real preference): (d) A is good, B is good; (e) A is bad, B is
bad; (f) A is intermediate, B is intermediate. The point is that, in a preference paradigm,
(a), (b) and (c) are not distinguishable and (d), (e) and (f) are not distinguishable. Possi-
bility (a) is a somewhat privileged case of preference, and in informal experiments there
may be a hope that when they find themselves in situations (b) or (c) rather than (a), ex-
perimental participants will speak up when they express their preference, indicating
that while they have a preference for one option over the other, they find both options
are acceptable or unacceptable (as the case may be). Overall, the preference (‘by mistake’
vs. ‘by accident’) and contrast (Mistake and Accident scenarios) design employed in the
donkey experiment is very powerful, but the interpretation of results remains a delicate
matter.
Let us now turn to the order effects we were primarily interested in. There is no ev-
idence that the results in the last two columns are different, either for the Mistake sce-
nario (χ2(1) = 3.0, p = .08), or for the Accident scenario (χ2(1) = .07, p = .80). In other
words, there is no evidence that the order of presentation of the response choices have
an influence on participants’ eventual decision: their preference for ‘by mistake’ is inde-
pendent from this option occurring first or second, and the absence of a visible prefer-
ence is also independent of order.
5.3 Discussion
We found that in controlled experimental circumstances, responses aligned with stan-
dard judgments about the donkey stories, and contrary to our hypothesis, this remains
true even when order effects are factored out. It may appear at first glance that only
responses to the ‘mistake’ story align with standard judgments about that story, since
there was no significant difference between the ‘by mistake’ and ‘by accident’ responses
to the ‘accident’ story. But what we found was a significant contrast between responses
to the two stories that aligns with standard existing judgments about the stories.
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Notice that the contrast between the donkey stories emerges even though partici-
pants only saw one or the other story, not both as in Austin’s original presentation. And
the donkey stories are not accompanied by any gloss. Both of those factors indicate that
responses to the stories are tracking some underlying difference in meaning between ‘by
mistake’ and ‘by accident’ (though see the warnings about difficulties involved in inter-
preting the data mentioned above in §5.2).
6 Conclusion
The project of dissolving traditional philosophical debates by paying close attention to
the ordinary use of philosophically significant expressions has come under withering
criticism in the 60 or so years since its heyday. But the experimental approach to the
study of meaning employed by Austin, whether conducted informally or formally, re-
mains the dominant methodology in both philosophy and linguistics. Contemporary ex-
perimental studies in semantics and pragmatics employ more sophisticated, controlled
versions of what are essentially Austin’s methods, in which participants are asked to
imagine some situations and data is collected regarding what they say about those situa-
tions. Hypotheses about the meaning of certain expressions can be confirmed or discon-
firmed based on what participants say in response to the situations presented in experi-
mental conditions.24
Austin says that he’s interested in experimental linguistic data, with the aim of com-
ing to a better understanding of subtle distinctions in the meaning of philosophically
significant expressions. Looking in detail at the methods that he and many others use to
gather that data reveals that while some experiments generate robust results indepen-
dently of possible biases (cf. the absence of order effects in the donkey stories), some fea-
tures of the design of these experiments (such as the presence of a gloss in Austin’s go-
cart and racing-car experiments) actually obscure the phenomena they aim to uncover.
Our aim in this paper has been to focus attention on the experimental methods Austin
(and many others) employ to investigate fine distinctions in meaning and indicate what
features of those experiments could be problematic and where those methods can be
made more rigorous.
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